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stances	are	 they	willing	 to	share	 this	data?	What	should	a	platform	do	to	
support	data	sharing?	We	explore	those	research	questions	as	part	of	the	









The used car market is characterized by information asymmetries: The seller of a car 
knows more about the quality of a car than a potential buyer. As already noted by 
Akerlof [1], markets with such information asymmetries are prone to fail as ‘lemons’ 
(= bad cars) drive out ‘peaches’ (= good cars) until the market collapses. It is thus in 
the primary interest of used car platforms, such as Autoscout24, to decrease infor-
mation asymmetries. If potential buyers could gain sufficient information about the 
quality of a used car, they would not need leave the platform to physically inspect 
many cars or turn to professional used car dealers because of their reputation and 
guarantees. This would increase traffic on the platform and ultimately the revenue of 
the platform. 
Systems like Cardossier promise to increase market transparency: They collect all 
important events in the lifecycle of a car, e. g. registrations, accidents, repairs, and 
driving behavior. So, used car platforms are interested to integrate them into their 
offering. However, the history of a car can contain sensitive data about the car’s driv-
ers and owners. European data protection laws require the consent of the car sellers 
for the release of such sensitive data. So, the question arises: What can a platform do 
to acquire this consent from car sellers?  
As a first step, the platform needs to understand what sensitive information car 
buyers are interested in when looking for a used car. Interesting sensitive information 
may not be limited to information about the car’s history. Car buyers may also want 
to establish interpersonal trust in the car seller in order to accept any remaining in-
formation asymmetries; and car sellers may want to establish trust in the car buyer to 
make sure that they receive the payment for the car and that the car is not misused 
while they are still legally responsible for it. Such interpersonal trust building could 
be mediated [2] by platforms by providing certified information about the seller or the 
buyer. So, we ask very generally:    
RQ1: What sensitive data are sellers and buyers interested in and willing to share? 
Only if information consumers (= classically: the buyers) are ‘sufficiently’ inter-
ested in getting access and information providers (= classically: the sellers) are ‘suffi-
ciently’ willing to provide data, there is a chance that they can share data on the plat-
form. Economically, ‘sufficient’ means that the information consumers need to value 
information at least as high as the information providers value the compromised pri-
vacy. If this is the case, a platform can facilitate the exchange of data, e. g. by asking 
the information consumer to remunerate the information provider. In a first explorato-
ry study, we will address research question 1. The answer provides the platform in-
sights, what data should be provided.  
However, willingness to share is not free of context. Car sellers may want to re-
lease sensitive data only to selected buyers and only once the negotiation has pro-
gressed to a certain stage. So, the question how data sharing should be orchestrated 
remains. We will address this question in a second exploratory study, asking: 
RQ2: What preferences and expectations do individuals have when disclosing their 
personal information in the used car market? 
The answer to this question will provide used car platforms with requirements for 
building systems that facilitate data exchange and ultimately reduce information 
asymmetries in the market for lemons.  
The subsequent section will first introduce related work on emerging changes in 
the used car market and the role of platforms as a mediator and as a car data market. 
As the envisioned markets do not yet exist, behavioral data on privacy preferences 
and privacy disclosure behavior is still lacking. We therefore inform our research 
from the closest existing domain: eCommerce. We ask how privacy is conceptualized 
there, what people expect, and how data disclosure is managed.  
After the related work, we introduce the chosen research methodology, the re-
search setting, and the data collection. As we strive to improve the market position of 
the used car platform, we selected a design research approach. The research is situated 
as a part of the Cardossier project. Data is collected from experiments with Car-
Market Game. Car-Market Game is a game that simulates a future used car platform.  
The subsequent results section offers the data collected in two experiments. Data 
from the first experiment indicates that there is no market for purely personal data (e. 
g. a photograph of the other party), but there is a market for car usage data. Data col-
lected in the second round of experiments validates the insights from the first experi-
ments. In addition, results indicate that participants expect disclosure control and 
disclosure transparency in an environment free of interpersonal trust.  
The subsequent discussion section analyzes what the insights mean for used car 
platforms, translates those insights into requirements for platform owners, and present 




Cars become increasingly software-intensive [3] and car manufacturers strive to de-
velop platforms [4] to generate value from the data gathered during car usage. EU 
initiatives limit their power, forcing car manufacturers to provide open interfaces for 
third parties to make use of the data. Other actors in the car ecosystem, such as garag-
es, insurances, mobility service providers, and registration authorities, wake up and 
see the opportunities in generating value from their ‘data treasures’. They team up in 
Blockchain consortia [5] to jointly generate value in a distributed setting [6]. One 
value proposition is a jointly generated Cardossier that reduces the information 
asymmetries in the used car market. While such a Cardossier may be a double-edged 
sword for garages and established used car dealers [7], used car platforms will be net-
benefactors. Until now, their activities have been limited to the information search 
phase [8] of a used car sale. The actual deal is closed outside the platform with a used 
car dealer or a private person. A trustworthy and complete Cardossier turns a used car 
into a commodity and it may be traded without inspection just like a new car. This 
allows used car platforms to expand their offering up to the actual transaction phase, i. 
e. deals can be negotiated and closed over the platform. The platform can then offer 
new services such as payments, certified data or trust mediation.  
 
Prior research indicates that there indeed is a market for trusted car data [9] and that a 
complete Cardossier has a value in the order of 100 Euros. This research assumes that 
this data is available in the market place and stakeholders are willing to share it. Re-
searchers have addressed multiple issues here such as the architecture of such a sys-
tem [5], assuring data quality [10], the inclusion of the public sector [11], and the 
building of an appropriate governance [12]. It is also clear that car usage data can be 
sensitive and is protected by GDPR [13]. Therefore, its use on platforms needs the car 
owner’s consent. However, it remains unclear whether the sellers are actually willing 
to share sensitive data and where the buyers see value. 
There are three types of data that is potentially relevant for used car sales:  
1. The static core data of a car, such as its brand, age, color, or weight. This data is 
readily available as soon as the car has been produced and it is captured in public 
platforms for little charge. Most countries agree that this data is not sensitive.   
2. The car usage data covering what has been done with the car and what has hap-
pened to it, e. g. repair data, accident data, registration data, or driving behavior da-
ta (who?, where?, when?, how careful? etc.). In Europe, this data is regarded as 
sensitive data under GDPR. 
3. The personal data of the sellers (or buyers), i. e. their names, addresses, picture, 
job, credit history etc. This data is also sensitive.  
Static core data is or will soon be readily available in many countries and is not sensi-
tive. Therefore, it is not relevant for this study. The other two types of data are rele-
vant. If car usage data is relevant and the platform can persuade the stakeholders to 
release it, the platform can not only expand its reach on the value chain, but also es-
tablish itself as an actor in car data trade [9]. If personal data of the sellers or buyers is 
important, a used car platform can establish itself as a mediator of interpersonal trust 
[2]. Research on this issue should take into account what we already know about 
privacy in the eCommerce sector. 
 
2.2 Privacy	in	eCommerce:	Privacy	Behavior	and	Privacy	Negotiations	
Privacy can be defined as a dynamic process of social boundary management by 
which individuals grant or deny access to other individuals or one’s group [14]. Pri-
vacy boundaries are often negotiated between the involved parties and readjusted over 
time. However, if they are not clearly defined or the parties differ in their privacy 
rules, conflicts arise. These conflicts can affect the willingness to disclose information 
and hinder the relationship between the parties, or worse, lead to reluctance [15].  
In the eCommerce context, online privacy can be referred to as the process of con-
trolling access to the self while using Internet services. A distinction is made between 
the desired level of online privacy (the extent of control users want) and the achieved 
level of online privacy (factual privacy that users acknowledge having and executing) 
[14]. Bringing their achieved online privacy in line with their desired level is a con-
tinuous process of optimizing privacy and self-disclosure. Thereby, individuals follow 
the privacy calculus that posits: Online self-disclosures are based on a cost-benefit 
tradeoff [16] that is influenced by the lack of control resulting from the risk of fraudu-
lent actions and mistrust towards the information recipient (in eCommerce mostly a 
company) [17]. The literature, however, stresses that emotional, situational, affect-
based and contextual factors also influence this calculation [18], especially in online 
contexts [19]. The actual online privacy behavior furthermore depends on the user’s 
attitude towards privacy. The user’s attitude is influenced by past experiences with 
privacy breaches and by their skills in using the Internet (literacy) [20].  
Privacy behavior and privacy calculus manifest themselves in user preferences on 
withholding and revealing personal information. These preferences can be adminis-
tered by privacy management. An appropriate privacy management does not only 
allow users to control data access, but also offers traceability of data use by the plat-
form, data providers, and data consumers [21]. Previous research covered traceability 
of personal data in social networking sites [22], on mobile phones [23], and towards 
third parties in business relations [21]. However, there is currently no insight into a 
peer-to-peer used car market. 
The used car market resembles more peer-to-peer markets like eBay than business-
to-consumer markets like the core of Amazon. In these consumer-to-consumer mar-
kets, the quality of products is frequently uncertain, and prices are frequently agreed 
upon in auctions or negotiations. The used car business distinguishes itself from even 
those consumer-to-consumer platforms, as it deals with a highly valuable product 
with a history that is potentially sensitive. Hence, it is unclear whether the disclosure 
control and trust building strategies suggested by literature (e. g. [17, 24]) can be 
applied in this context.  
3 Research	Design	and	Methodology	
This research was conducted as part of an Action Design Research [25] project striv-
ing to develop the Cardossier. The research reported here strives to uncover require-
ments for enhancing the trade of sensitive data in used car markets. Requirements are 
a typical outcome of design research [26, 27]. The requirements were elicited in two 
exploratory studies. In each of them, users were exposed to the Car-Market Game, an 
experimental platform that simulates a future used car market. This Car-Market Game 
provided features for searching for cars, buying and selling data from the Cardossier, 
negotiating with potential sellers, and settling a transaction. After playing the Car-
Market Game, the participants were asked to state their privacy expectations and to 
evaluate existing privacy features. The first study explored the interest in sensitive 
data and the willingness to share personal information to find an answer to our RQ1. 
The second study investigated the car sale negotiation process for an in-depth under-
standing of the privacy disclosure behavior and inherent preferences of the partici-
pants to derive requirements as an answer to our RQ2. For data collection we used a 
mixed-method approach, including quantitative and qualitative methods [28]. The 
next sections will briefly introduce the Cardossier project and the methods for data 
collection before it will go into details on the experimental design.   
3.1 The Cardossier Project1  
The “Cardossier Project” aims to develop an electronic record for the used car trade in 
Switzerland based on a consortium distributed ledger. The initial consortium of com-
panies and organizations consisted of an insurance company, a car dealer and import-
er, a car sharing company, a road traffic authority, a software company, and two uni-
versities. The main objective of this project is the reduction of information asymme-
tries by providing a car’s history that decreases uncertainty and increases trust be-
tween the parties involved. It aims to digitalize and improve the processes, minimize 
redundancies, and establish a trusted digital ecosystem for car-related data manage-
ment between all the players participating in the life cycle of a car. The different 
stakeholders contribute car-specific data, utilization-related personal data and person-
al data to the Cardossier. A more detailed explanation can be found in [10, 29].  
 
1 https://www.cardossier.ch (Last accessed: 11/30/2020) 
3.2 Data Collection 
We conducted two experimental games with the Car-Market Game in 2018 and 2019. 
After each game, we applied surveys to gather information on privacy preferences and 
expectations [30]. The survey applied open questions, closed questions, and Likert 
scales. The questionnaire in the first survey consisted of the following sections that 
are of relevance for this study: 
• Demographic data of the test persons 
• Assessment of relevance of personal information 
• Willingness to buy/trade personal information 
• Importance to control the disclosure of personal information 
The questionnaire in the second survey consisted of the following sections that are of 
relevance for this study: 
• Demographic data of the test persons 
• Willingness to disclose data 
• Importance of control 
• Importance of traceability 
• Evaluation of design elements 
The survey after the second experiment was augmented with semi-structured inter-
views [31] with a subset of the participants. Each interview addressed the following 
topics: general questions about the interviewee, attitude to data markets and attitude to 
disclosure of data. These interviews were recorded and transcribed in a verbatim 
manner [30]. Based on this, two researchers deductively and inductively processed the 
core themes to understand the relations between them (axial coding). This process 
generated insight concerned with, e.g. interest in data, willingness to buy/sell, disclo-
sure behavior and negotiation behavior as presented below [32]. 
3.3 Experimental Design 
The Car-Market Game can be configured to simulate a traditional or future used car 
platform (i. e. AutoScout24.ch). Buyers find information on cars posted by the seller 
and then can negotiate directly within the platform about the sales price using a chat 
dialog. In each experiment, the participants had to sell (role of seller) respectively buy 
(role of buyer) a car. The goal was to maximize the relative revenue2 when buying or 
selling a car.  
In the first experiment (E1), 50 bachelor students participated. The students volun-
teered for the experiment but received incentives (shopping vouchers). Table 1 shows 
their demographic data. To communicate the intentions of the Cardossier project in a 
clear and readily understandable manner before the experiment, a moderator held a 
presentation using a screencast that showed the features of the game. Each participant 
was randomly assigned either the role of a buyer or the role of a seller. Sellers were 
 
2 Computed from the final sales/purchase price and the actual value of the car. 
provided with cars and information on cars from an existing collaborating used car 
platform. Buyers were provided with a budget for buying the car. The experiment 
consisted of two game rounds in which different versions of the game were played. 
After each round, the test persons had to fill out a questionnaire about their willing-
ness to trade or their interest in the data items.3 In the first round, the participants 
played a classical scenario (classical round), similar to existing conventional online 
used car platforms. In the second game round, car buyers and sellers could buy veri-
fied car lifecycle information from the Cardossier (round with Cardossier).   
After analyzing the results of the first experiment, we changed and extended the 
game application according to our findings and feedback.  
In the second experiment (E2), 48 university students participated voluntarily (see 
Table 1 for their characteristics). All took part in the subsequent survey and five vol-
unteers were interviewed directly after the experiment. The main objective of the 
experiment was to investigate the test persons’ privacy disclosure behavior while 
negotiating about used cars. Therefore, the subjects played only the game version 
with the Cardossier. 
Table 1. Demographic data of test persons 
 E1 (n=48/50)3 E2 (n=48) 
Character Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Gender Male 38 (79.2%) 37 (77.1%) 
Female 10 (20.8%) 11 (22.9%) 
Age 20-30 44 (91.7%) 47 (97.9%) 
31-40 3 (6.2%) 1 (2.1%) 
41 and above 1 (2,1%) - (-) 
No. of used cars bought so far 0 35 (72.9%) 34 (70.8%) 
1 10 (20.8%) 9 (18.8%) 
2 and more 3 (6.3%) 5 (10.4%) 
Already bought a car via an 
online platform? 
yes 13 (27.1%) 7 (14.6%) 
no 35 (72.9%) 41 (85.4%) 
4 Results 
We structure our findings according to our two exploratory studies and the research 
questions raised in the introductory section.  
4.1 First study: Exploring interest in data and willingness to share 
In the first study, we addressed the first research question (RQ1): What sensitive data 
are sellers and buyers interested in and willing to share?  
After playing the conventional game (classical round without the Cardossier), the 
subjects were asked to evaluate the potential relevance of sensitive data (Table 2). 
The vast majority of the buyers and sellers selected the history of accidents as rele-
 
3 Note: 2 persons failed to complete the survey after the first round. 
vant. Half the buyers and the vast majority of the sellers also regarded driving behav-
ior as relevant. So, all in all, utilization related personal data clearly appears to be 
relevant. The picture is less clear on personal data. While a little more than half the 
participants regarded name, address, and date of birth as relevant, only a minority 
regarded bank data and information on the driving experience (as indicated by how 
long the person has had a driver’s license) as relevant. 
Table 2. Assessment of the relevance of personal information by item type 
Personal data 
Car Buyers (n=24)4 
Frequency (%) 
Car Sellers (n=24)5 
Frequency (%) 
Name, date of birth, address 13 (54.2%) 12 (50.0%) 
Bank / payment data 9 (37.5%) 8 (33.3%) 
Driving experience 4 (16.7%) 12 (50.0%) 
Utilization-related personal data     
History of accidents 21 (87.5%) 20 (83.3%) 
Driving behavior (frequent/infrequent) 12 (50.0%) 20 (83.3%) 
In the second game round of the first experiment, the participants were exposed to the 
Cardossier. Therefore, we could ask more specifically for their willingness to buy or 
offer the data items after this game. The picture is similar to results after the first 
round (Table 3): The majority of the sellers would be willing to sell the history of 
accidents and the past driving behavior. A majority of the car buyers would also be 
willing to buy a history of accidents. However, only 40% would buy data on driving 
behavior. Their willingness to buy personal data is even lower: It ranges between 20% 
and 32% while less than half of the sellers would be willing to sell this data. 
Table 3. Assessment of the willingness to buy/offer personal information by item type 
Personal data 
Car Buyers (n=25)6 
Frequency (%) 
Car Sellers (n=25)7 
Frequency (%) 
Name, date of birth, address 8 (32%) 11 (44%) 
Bank / payment data 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 
Driving experience 5 (20%) 10 (40%) 
Utilization-related personal data     
History of accidents 20 (80%) 19 (76%) 
Driving behavior (frequent/infrequent) 10 (40%) 14 (56%) 
We conclude from this experiment that it is dubious whether market participants are 
really interested in personal data and willing to share it for money. The picture is 
 
4 Question: “What personal information about the seller would influence your buying deci-
sion?” 
5 Question: “What personal information about yourself would you provide to a potential buyer 
in order to obtain a higher price, if necessary?” 
6 Question: “What personal information about the seller would you pay for to support your 
purchase decision?” 
7 Question: “What personal information about yourself would you provide in the Cardossier in 
order to achieve a higher return (higher sales price/revenue for your provided data)?” 
more positive for data on car usage: Here, participants appear to be interested and 
willing to trade for money. 
4.2 Designing for Privacy in the Car-Market Game 
Beyond those key insights on willingness to share, interviews and questionnaires from 
the first experiment offered additional insight for the designing for privacy in the Car-
Market Game. Participants voiced a clear preference for controlling the disclosure of 
sensitive data. In the questionnaire, the participants rated its importance with 5.48 on 
a Likert scale from 1 = ‘Not at all important’ to 7= ‘Extremely important’. The analy-
sis of the interviews led to the identification of three important topics: The global 
disclosure of information to all participants of the platform, the disclosure of infor-
mation to a specific partner during the course of the negotiation and the transparency 
of the public profile.  
 We therefore implemented the following design elements: 
• Global Disclosure Control (global, see Figure 2, on the left,): Buyers and sellers 
can define, if and for which price they disclose data to all users of the platform.  
• Individual Disclosure Control: Sellers can define, which car usage data they 
disclose to their current negotiation partner for free (Figure 3).  
• Privacy Preview (see Figure 2, on the right): Buyers and sellers can see what 
their public profile looks like.  
 
Figure 1. Searching for cars in the marketplace 
 
Figure 2. Example of global disclosure control and preview of personal data 
 
Figure 3. Individual privacy disclosure and chat for negotiation 
We furthermore added a personal photograph of the seller or buyer (see Figure 2, on 
the upper left) to the prior personal information as an element that could enhance 
interpersonal trust.  
In the actual game, all users would sign in and set their global privacy settings 
(Figure 2). The sellers would then finish their car profile (e. g. adding sales price) and 
wait for interested buyers to start a negotiation. The buyers select cars from the mar-
ketplace (Figure 1) and start a negotiation (Figure 3). During the negotiation, sellers 
can release sensitive data for free.  
4.3 Second exploratory study: Identifying preferences and expectations 
The second study had two goals:  
First, we wanted to validate the insights from the first study: Is personal data of car 
buyers and sellers really not relevant in the course of a car sale? And is car usage data 
really relevant? To get more insights we made the privacy choices more personal for 
the test participants: We added real pictures of them to their player profile to make the 
personal data more realistic. And we personalized their car data through in-game 
tests: an IQ test was used to calculate the accident history for the sellers' cars (the 
more fault points, the more accidents) and an online driving test was used to derive 
the driving behavior data of their cars8. We also made the privacy choices more eco-
nomically sound: Both buyers and sellers were not only asked about their willingness 
to sell or buy personal data, but could also set a price for their personal data in their 
global settings and offer it there. Since the participants were exposed to privacy man-
agement features in the game, we could not only ask for their preferences but also 
study their behavior. The results should finally answer RQ 1 on what data should be 
provided by a platform. 
  
The second goal addresses RQ2: How should this data be provided, and privacy be 
managed? Assuming that at least some sensitive data is relevant, we wanted to under-
stand, how buyers and sellers accepted the disclosure control design elements and 
what further preferences they had for disclosure control. 
 
a) Results for RQ1: What sensitive data are sellers and buyers interested in and 
willing to share? 
In the questionnaire the participants voiced only limited willingness to disclose per-
sonal data (Table 4). The ratings show that the willingness to disclose data toward an 
individual counterpart has a moderate agreement, for personal data as well as car 
usage data. The disclosure free of charge has the lowest approval, and the general 
disclosure of car usage data is also rated slightly positive. 
 
8 To comply with ethical guidelines, the players could opt out of using their real data; genuine 
data use was incentivized by a flat payment of 20 Swiss francs and 72% of the participant opted 
for it. 
Table 4. Willingness to disclose 
(Average rating on a scale from 1= ‘I do not agree at all’ to 7= ‘I totally agree’; n=48) 
 Willingness to disclose globally 
Willingness to 
disclose for free 
Willingness to dis-
close to an individual 
counterpart 
Personal data 3.8 3.0 4.1 
Utilization-related personal data 4.3 3.6 4.4 
Consequently, only gender data was released for free by the majority (Table 5). For 
the other data items the information providers either asked for a fee (27%-54%) or did 
not disclose them at all (20-35%). 






For a fee 
Frequency (%) 
Photo 17 (35.4%) 11 (22.9%) 20 (41.7%) 
Gender 3 (6.2%) 32 (66.7%) 13 (27.1%) 
Name 10 (20.8%) 15 (31.3%) 23 (47.9%) 
Date of birth 11 (22.9%) 11 (22.9%) 26 (54.2%) 
Address 17 (35.4%) 5 (10.4%) 26 (54.2%) 
Utilization-related personal data 
(sellers only; n=24) 
      
Accident history 7 (29.2%) 2 (8.3%) 15 (62.5%) 
Driving behavior 9 (37.5%) 6 (25.0%) 9 (37.5%) 
How does this offer impact the actual market transactions on sensitive data? (Table 
6). Nearly no transactions on personal data occurred. So, the valuation of the seller 
was consistently higher than the valuation of the buyers. Therefore, we conclude: 
There is no market for personal data in the used car market. 





of purchases  
Expected average 
price9 
Photo 1 CHF 50.00 CHF 117.09 
Gender 0 - CHF 32.62 
Name 0 - CHF 70.19 
Date of birth 0 - CHF 76.16 
Address 0 - CHF 56.50 
Utilization-related personal data     
Accident history 14 CHF 119.29 CHF 93.93 
Driving behavior 1 CHF 15.00 CHF 70.00 
The picture is different for car usage data. Although only a minority offered this data 
for free, quite a few transactions happened (see Table 6). So, there is a market for car 
usage data what is slightly confirmed with the results of our survey: On a scale from 
 
9 Values higher or equal to CHF 1000 were regarded as outliers and left out 
1= ‘I do not agree at all’ to 7= ‘I totally agree’ the respondents rated the statement of 
being willing to buy utilization-related personal data with 4.2. The interviews sup-
ported this observation without providing further insights. 
b) Results for RQ2: What preferences and expectations do individuals have 
when disclosing their personal information in the used car market? 
All three new design elements were evaluated positively.  
Global Disclosure: All participants actually used global disclosure in their general 
offering to the marketplace. In the questionnaire the global disclosure mechanism 
(Figure 4) was rated transparent10 with a 4.9 on a Likert scale from (1= ‘I do not agree 
at all’ to 7= ‘I totally agree’). So, we conclude that the participants of the used car 
market expect a global disclosure control (= preference P1). 
Individual Disclosure: Willingness to provide data to individuals was rated highest 
in the questionnaire (Table 4) and 15 participants actually used individual disclosure 
control in their negotiations. Thus, we conclude that the participants of the used car 
market expect a context-dependent individual disclosure control (= Preference P2). 
Privacy Preview: During the game all participants used the preview function (lo-
cated on the same page in the right; see Figure 2). After the game we asked the test 
persons if the preview function made the disclosure settings transparent11 and got an 
agreement with a mean of 5.0. For this reason, we formulate as third preference (P3): 
Car buyers and sellers want to have a preview of the disclosure outcome. 
Tracebility: We furthermore asked the par-
ticipants of the second experiment whether 
tracing is important to them, i. e. to see to 
whom and for how long data was disclosed 
and who has accessed it, at what time. We got 
a clear agreement in all cases (Figure 4), alt-
hough a traceability support was currently not 
yet implemented in the game. Thus, based on 
these answers, we state our fourth preference 
(P4): Data providers prefer traceability of data 
access and accessing actor. 
In the discussion section, we will develop 
the insight and preferences towards require-
ments that online used car platforms should 
address.  
5 Discussion 
The study results offer several insights for used car platform providers. What sensitive 
data are sellers and buyers interested in and willing to share? The results indicate 
that buyers and sellers do not have significant interest in each other’s personal data. 
Thus, it is not promising for the platform providers to design their system as a media-
 
10 Question: “I can track to whom I share my data and when” 
11 Question: “The preview function made the release settings easy to understand” 
 
Figure 4. Importance of traceability 
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who had accessed my data.
5,74 5,53
tor for interpersonal trust [2]. Rather, they should opt for a platform that is free of this 
kind of trust [33], via which car buyers and sellers negotiate to release information 
about their primary object of interest: the car and its history. In principle, a market 
exists for car usage data; and buyers and sellers are willing to engage in transactions 
of data. Thus, a Cardossier does not only promise to enhance traffic on a car platform, 
but platform providers may also extend their business model to providing certified car 
data [34]. This has further implications for used car ecosystems such as the Cardossier 
ecosystem. They should focus their efforts on collecting data on car usage and shy 
away from collecting data on the car owners. This is good news as personal data is 
even more difficult to handle and the collection of such data is even more difficult to 
justify than car usage data. 
What preferences and expectations do individuals have when disclosing their per-
sonal information on the used car market? Buyers and sellers prefer global disclosure 
control (P1), individual disclosure control (P2), a preview of the disclosure outcome 
(P3), and to trace data access and the accessing actor (P4). This leads to the three 
generic requirements of ‘Selective Disclosure Control’, ‘Disclosure Information 
Transparency’ and ‘Disclosure Process Transparency’ (Table 7).  
Table 7. Summary of requirements derived from preferences 
Preference Generic Requirements 
P1: Individuals expect global disclosure control. Selective Disclosure Control 
 P2: Individuals expect context-dependent individual 
disclosure control. 
P3: Individuals expect to have a preview of the 
disclosure outcome. 
Disclosure Information Transparency 
P4: Individuals expect to trace data access and the 
accessing actor. 
Disclosure Process Transparency 
Selective Disclosure Control: We define selective disclosure control as the possibility 
to disclose data continuously or for a single instance according to the preferences and 
the situation of the data subject. Selective disclosure control enables car sellers to 
keep control over their data depending on their own perception of sensitivity (cf. [35, 
36]). Our results indicate that selective disclosure control in the used car market can 
be globally, i. e. context-independent (P1) or individually, i. e. context-dependent 
(P2).  
Disclosure Information Transparency: The ability to transmit how disclosure in-
formation is presented can be conceptualized as an instance of information transpar-
ency ([37], p. 4). Disclosure information transparency can thus been defined as the 
degree of the data subject being enabled to monitor and comprehend the information 
used as the basis of personal data disclosure and to assess their quality and suitability. 
Disclosure information transparency enables data subjects to effectively prevent un-
desired consequences and produce a desired profile toward others [36]. 
Disclosure Process Transparency: The ability to trace information use can be con-
ceptualized as an instance of process transparency ([38], p. 280). Disclosure process 
transparency can thus be defined as the degree of the data subject being able to follow 
and comprehend the performed activities with their personal data. In the context of a 
used car market, buyers and sellers can not only use disclosure process transparency 
to protect their privacy but also as a strategic instrument in their negotiation. For ex-
ample, if a seller knows that a buyer has accessed a critical information item (e. g. on 
an accident), the seller may negotiate differently than if the buyer has not accessed the 
information item.  
The need for selective disclosure control, disclosure information transparency, and 
disclosure process transparency reveals that the general privacy calculus known from 
eCommerce is incomplete: In the used car market, online self-disclosure is not only 
based on a cost-benefit tradeoff [16] on the personal impact and risks of data release, 
but also on the cost-benefit analysis of releasing data as a tactical instrument during 
negotiations in an environment free of interpersonal trust. Car sellers may hide (or 
highly price) sensitive car data of lemons or may signal high quality by making it 
available for free.  
6 Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
Used car platforms were the primary addressees of this paper and, indeed, they have a 
lot to gain if they manage to include car usage data into their platform. They can take 
a larger share of the used car market and establish themselves as data traders. The 
insights, requirements, and design elements proposed in this paper should be more 
comprehensively implemented and evaluated to understand how exactly car sellers 
and buyers can be enabled to efficiently and effectively manage car usage data and 
how this relates to the value proposition of a future used car platform. Results indicate 
that platforms should provide selective disclosure control, disclosure information 
transparency and disclosure process transparency. While it is quite obvious, how 
global disclosure control should be implemented, individual disclosure control is 
more challenging: What exactly defines the individual context? How can disclosure 
control be embedded in the communication and negotiation process? Future research 
in this direction can not only guide platform providers in building better used car 
platforms but also lead to a better understanding what the privacy calculus in such 
settings is.  
 
Future research should also validate the presented results in other contexts as the 
current results come with limitations. The Car-Market Game and the contained design 
elements were tested and evaluated with students as test persons. This test group was 
quite homogenous and the average age was about 25, which is younger than the aver-
age used car buyer. In this group, only about half of the participants had have experi-
ence with buying used cars. And the experiment was situated in a safe environment; 
car sellers and buyers may value personal data and interpersonal trust-building higher, 
if their opponents are potentially threatening.   
 
Other stakeholders will have to react to the threat of being disintermediated. Used car 
dealers may not only use the remaining information asymmetries as a basis for their 
business but also apply car usage data to improve their advice giving and to provide 
new products [7]. Also, car manufacturers, car importers, and garages may re-evaluate 
the value of their data treasure and use it to create platforms that compete established 
used car platforms. They can make different, potentially more attractive, offers for car 
usage data than car platforms, for example free or discounted services. But all need to 
understand the needs of car owners, requiring control and transparency. Future re-
search will need to understand how those other stakeholders can take them into ac-
count. 
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